Net Neutrality Monitor analyses how Internet Service Providers resolve, block and inject DNS traffic. The platform tracks servers under examination, surfaces country-level reports, and publishes a live blacklist of injected addresses.
View Country ReportsWhat the platform does
Net Neutrality Monitor provides real-time analysis of the censorship systems used by Internet Service Providers. It tracks DNS servers currently under examination, lists known DNS servers that respond correctly to specific tests, and produces country reports on the types of blocking detected — from gambling and file-sharing to streaming and image hosting.
- DNS probes
- Country reports
- Injected addresses
- ISP scoring
Coverage across the monitored regions
Country reports are available for China, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Korea Republic of, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and additional regions as new probes are activated.
- 11+Countries with published reports
- LiveDNS server list under examination
- CC BY 2.5 IT / BY-SA 3.0Content licensing applied
- OpenDonations and probe submissions
SNI Filtering in Modern Censorship
Server Name Indication (SNI) lets a network identify the hostname a user is trying to reach during the TLS handshake. The field is normally visible, so an Internet service provider can match it against a blacklist and terminate the connection. The browser says the site cannot be reached; the web page never loads.
For Australians, SNI filtering is not exotic. Major domestic providers have used it for material designated as child sexual abuse material, while other blocks arise from malware, security lists, or industry arrangements. The reason matters because one symptom can reflect censorship, poor configuration, or an ordinary outage.
Modern censors combine DNS interference, traffic timing, direct IP blocking, and inspection of encrypted handshakes. Net Neutrality Monitor tracks these layers across countries so blocked websites and IP addresses can be compared with DNS, probe, blacklist, and statistical evidence rather than judged from one failed page.
How SNI Filtering Works
During an HTTPS visit, DNS turns a hostname into an IP address, then the client sends a TLS ClientHello containing the requested server name. A censor can inspect that plaintext SNI value, match it against a filtering list, and reset or drop the handshake. No HTTP request reaches the website, so there may be no page or status code to inspect.
| Layer | Typical signal | What it may indicate | Main caveat |
|---|---|---|---|
| DNS | NXDOMAIN, SERVFAIL, or an unexpected IP | Resolver-level filtering or redirection | A bad resolver or geolocation can look similar |
| TLS | Reset or timeout after a ClientHello with the target SNI | Hostname or handshake interference | Dropped packets and overloaded servers can mimic it |
| HTTP | A valid 403, 404, or 451 response | The server or application rejected the request | It usually means TLS succeeded |
| Network comparison | Different behaviour by provider or location | Stronger evidence of path-specific filtering | CDN routing and regional outages need controls |
SNI filtering is narrower than reading page content. It normally reveals the hostname, not the full URL or message because those remain inside TLS encryption. It can still be disruptive when one hostname serves many cloud-hosted addresses. An IP block can produce a similar result without exposing the hostname.
Encrypted ClientHello encrypts most of the ClientHello, including the real server name. This defeats simple SNI matching, but not guaranteed access. A censor can still block the destination IP, use traffic timing, or probe suspected addresses to learn which site a resolver returns. Encrypted DNS can hide queries from local observers while leaving endpoint signals visible.
Why the Signal Is Changing
The early model was a list checked at a gateway. Modern systems are more adaptive: blocklists update quickly, cloud infrastructure changes IP addresses, and providers may act on notices without a transparent process. Domain blocks are brittle, encouraging a mixture of DNS, SNI, IP, and protocol-level controls.
Encrypted traffic also weakens easy classification. A middlebox may distinguish a legitimate TLS session from an unusual protocol through packet shape, timing, and handshake behaviour. Active probing then connects to suspected addresses with different hostnames, seeking a revealing response. The resulting block can apply to an IP even when the original SNI was hidden.
Circumvention services and support resources must account for combined signals. The ICTD access support platform offers practical background on internet access, filtering, and operational realities. Its value lies in tying technical intervention to a clear threat model and local knowledge, rather than treating every workaround as equally safe or effective.
Australia’s Censorship and Internet Landscape
Australia has used SNI blocking since 2018, when major providers began blocking sites identified as hosting child sexual abuse material. The framework has evolved through legislation, court orders, and government-requested list expansions. ACMA, the eSafety Commissioner, and provider transparency reports form part of the accountability picture, although their roles differ.
The market shape magnifies the effect. Telstra, Optus, and TPG are prominent fixed-line and mobile providers, so filtering adopted by major networks can reach most households and mobile users. Fixed broadband, mobile, and business connections differ: filters may sit at different points, and moving from home NBN to 5G changes no browser settings.
Australians often say “the site is blocked” or “DNS is leaking”, even when failure occurs during the TLS handshake. Geography adds another layer. A probe from Sydney, Perth, Adelaide, or regional Australia may take a different backbone or international cable route, so results should be compared over time and from multiple vantage points.
Precise labels matter. An Australian resident considering an overseas betting platform faces federal, state, and territory rules, not merely a network filter. The cross-border casino guidance explains why availability does not establish that participation is lawful, and why accessibility data should be separate from legal advice.
How Net Neutrality Monitor Tracks Filtering
Net Neutrality Monitor is a beta, volunteer-supported project powered by AirVPN. It collects blocked websites and IP addresses, then relates them to blacklists, DNS answers, probes, and country statistics. Submitted URLs or IP addresses can be checked against recorded behaviour, giving researchers and affected users a common evidence base rather than an untested anecdote.
The method compares the path to a target, hostname presented during TLS, returned address, and any HTTP result obtained. Repeated measurements help separate consistent policy from a temporary resolver problem. Reports remain indicative research: a country label does not identify a particular ISP, and a successful probe does not mean every user sees the same result.
A convincing finding usually combines several of these signals:
- The hostname fails through one Australian network but loads through a control network.
- Failure occurs during the TLS handshake, before any HTTP status code.
- Changing the resolver does not help while the same SNI is presented.
- Repeated tests show a reset or timeout tied to the target hostname.
Several common observations are much weaker:
- NXDOMAIN appears with only one public resolver.
- A connection times out without a successful control comparison.
- The site returns 403 because of location, age, or account state.
- A CDN hostname resolves to an unusable regional edge server.
Country pages combine observations with context. Public-interest research, including public safety research on unmanned aircraft systems, depends on distinguishing targeted interference from technical failure. That distinction matters when measurements inform policy, safety planning, or user guidance.
Comparing DNS, TLS, and HTTP Results
A DNS block is often confused with SNI filtering. DNS happens first: if a resolver returns NXDOMAIN or refuses to answer, the client never presents SNI. SNI filtering occurs later, when the address is found but the handshake is blocked after the server name appears. The symptom—“cannot be reached”—can conceal either layer.
A useful resource is the practical DNS censorship comparison, which explains how to interpret those layers without treating HTTP codes as proof of network censorship. A 403 response confirms that TLS completed and a server responded deliberately; a reset during ClientHello points elsewhere. Timeout, connection refused, NXDOMAIN, SERVFAIL, and unexpected redirects require separate treatment.
Measurement needs controls and repetition. Test the hostname through the relevant Australian provider, resolve it independently, try the IP where appropriate, and compare a known-good site under the same conditions. Record the resolver, network location, timestamp, SNI, and exact failure. This matters in Australia, where fixed-line and mobile providers may route the same target differently.
What Australian Users Should Remember
SNI filtering is one part of a wider censorship system. DNS filtering, IP blocking, TLS interference, throttling, and application-level denial can overlap, while ECH and encrypted DNS alter visible clues. Claims about a block should identify the layer, network, time, and comparison rather than treating “it did not load” as sufficient evidence.
For Australians, the useful distinction is between a legally mandated block, a provider security control, and a coincidental failure. The same result can come from a court-backed list, malware filtering, an overzealous router, or a regional CDN fault. Monitoring reports expose patterns across networks, but their indicative status and methodology must stay attached to findings.
The durable lesson is that censorship is a systems problem, not merely a missing webpage. By preserving DNS, TLS, probe, IP, and HTTP evidence, Net Neutrality Monitor turns scattered complaints into comparable observations. What should remain is simple: verify the layer, respect the context, and do not mistake one failed connection for what happened to every user.
Transparent, analytical, community-run
The platform documents how ISPs handle neutrality on the wire, with method notes, country breakdowns and a public blacklist of injected addresses. — Project methodology






