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Net Neutrality Monitor analyses how Internet Service Providers resolve, block and inject DNS traffic. The platform tracks servers under examination, surfaces country-level reports, and publishes a live blacklist of injected addresses.

View Country Reports
Continuous DNS probing across participating ISPs
Country-level neutrality scoring and breakdowns
Blacklist of injected addresses from probe data
Community-driven via forum, IRC and wiki

What the platform does

Net Neutrality Monitor provides real-time analysis of the censorship systems used by Internet Service Providers. It tracks DNS servers currently under examination, lists known DNS servers that respond correctly to specific tests, and produces country reports on the types of blocking detected — from gambling and file-sharing to streaming and image hosting.

  • DNS probes
  • Country reports
  • Injected addresses
  • ISP scoring
About the Project
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Coverage across the monitored regions

Country reports are available for China, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Korea Republic of, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and additional regions as new probes are activated.

  • 11+Countries with published reports
  • LiveDNS server list under examination
  • CC BY 2.5 IT / BY-SA 3.0Content licensing applied
  • OpenDonations and probe submissions
Browse DNS List
Monitored since 2010 Geo data · ipinfodb

Comparing DNS censorship and HTTP status codes

A blocked website can produce two very different traces: a failure in name resolution or a response from a web server. DNS censorship usually appears in the first trace, while an HTTP status code appears in the second. Neither tells the whole story on its own. The key is to identify which network layer produced the result before drawing a conclusion about filtering.

For users in Australia, that distinction is practical because the same address may behave differently across NBN providers, mobile networks, fixed-wireless services and virtual private networks. A resolver can be filtered even when the destination remains reachable, or a web server can deny a request after DNS has worked correctly. Combining both signals produces a clearer account of censorship than relying on whether a page opens.

What DNS censorship changes

DNS censorship occurs when a resolver is prevented from returning valid address records for a domain. A browser may never send an HTTP request because it does not know where to connect. Filtering can affect A and AAAA records, redirect a query to a warning address, or simply prevent the resolver from responding.

Several DNS replies require careful interpretation. NXDOMAIN says the queried name does not exist according to that resolver, although it may still be active elsewhere. SERVFAIL can indicate a temporary resolver failure, DNSSEC validation problem or deliberate interference. REFUSED means the resolver declined the query, while NOERROR with no address data leaves the domain unresolved without necessarily claiming it is absent.

One lookup is rarely enough to identify censorship. Geographic diversity matters because a single Australian vantage point can mistake a local routing fault for a national block. The value of combining many local observations is illustrated by crowdsourced evacuation planning, where community reports and professional maps reveal conditions that one viewpoint may miss.

Reading HTTP responses without guesswork

An HTTP status code exists only when an HTTP server or intermediary returns one. It normally follows successful DNS resolution, a TCP connection and the TLS handshake. A timeout or failed certificate negotiation may therefore have no status code at all, whereas a 403 response confirms that the server received and understood the request.

Common responses have different meanings. A 200 indicates success, although the body could still be an error page. A 301 or 302 is a redirect rather than censorship. A 403 may indicate authentication, geographic restrictions or an application policy. A 451 can signal legal restrictions, while 404 means the requested resource was not found. Server-side 500, 502 and 503 errors point to faults or upstream failures rather than direct filtering.

Access restrictions can also arise from law or site policy. The Australian Communications and Media Authority has issued blocking orders against prohibited offshore interactive gambling providers, whereas a licensed Australian operator may load normally. A related distinction appears in casino entry rules, where age and identity requirements can prevent access even though the venue itself is reachable.

Redirect chains and response bodies need attention as well. Repeated redirects to a provider’s notice page may be more informative than the final status alone. A branded block page can support a filtering interpretation, but its absence proves nothing. Comparisons should therefore include the complete redirect path, relevant headers and a sample of the returned content.

A layered measurement workflow

Start with a documented baseline. Record the exact time, URL, device, network, DNS resolver, VPN state and requested hostname. Capture both the DNS response and the HTTP outcome rather than opening the address only in a browser, since browser caching, secure DNS and extensions can conceal what happened.

Third-party measurements help reveal whether a failure is local. Public documentation on network probes describes how distributed vantage points collect comparable observations. Repeating the test from another network can separate a widespread block from an isolated resolver or routing problem without changing several variables at once.

Controls make the evidence more useful. Test an unrelated domain on the same resolver, then repeat the target through a different resolver and network. If the control fails, the resolver or connection is suspect. If DNS succeeds but HTTP fails, the investigation moves to the destination, intermediary or transport path. Direct-IP tests must retain the correct hostname for TLS and the HTTP Host header or they may produce misleading results.

Comparing the signals side by side

DNS and HTTP evidence should be interpreted together. The strongest diagnosis comes from agreement between layers: blocked resolution plus a denial response is different from successful resolution plus a successful page. The grid below separates these common combinations without claiming that every observation has a single cause.

For wider context, the country comparison tool can help distinguish an Australian-specific pattern from recurring censorship elsewhere. Comparisons remain most meaningful when they align timestamps, test methods and network types.

DNS observation HTTP observation Most likely reading Confidence
Resolves with usable address records 200 with expected content Service is reachable through the tested paths High
NXDOMAIN Independent request returns 403 or 451 Filtering or restriction at both layers High
Resolves normally 403 Application, account or reverse-proxy policy denial Medium
NXDOMAIN Direct request returns 200 Resolver-specific filtering or a DNS-path mismatch Medium
Resolves normally Timeout or server error Failure occurred after name resolution Medium
SERVFAIL or REFUSED No response Both DNS and transport conditions require investigation Low

A mixed result such as NXDOMAIN with HTTP 200 is particularly valuable. It suggests that one resolver or DNS route is interfering while the tested HTTP path can still reach the service. That pattern should be repeated before being attributed to deliberate censorship.

Australian conditions that skew results

Australia’s internet market combines NBN Co’s wholesale access with retail providers such as Telstra, Optus and Vodafone, alongside regional fixed-wireless and satellite services. Different providers may use different recursive resolvers, security services and routing arrangements. A result associated with one connection should not automatically be treated as nationwide behaviour.

Geography also matters. Sydney and Melbourne have extensive local hosting and content-delivery infrastructure, while Perth connections may involve different international paths. Regional areas may depend more heavily on a provider’s aggregation route or satellite link. These variations can create timeouts and inconsistent resolution that resemble censorship but originate in network capacity or peering.

Everyday tests can introduce further differences. A hotspot in a Melbourne café may use a different resolver from a home connection in Hobart, while a work network may apply threat protection. When Australians say a site “is not coming through”, the cause could be DNS filtering, an HTTP denial, an overloaded origin or a local Wi-Fi problem. Repeating the address across home, mobile and independent test networks helps separate these cases.

Building a reliable monitoring routine

Net Neutrality Monitor accepts URL and IP address submissions and publishes blocked-site records, blacklist information, probe observations, DNS data and statistics. As a beta, volunteer-supported project developed and powered by AirVPN, its results are best treated as indicative research rather than a definitive legal ruling. Clear roles also matter in volunteer work, a principle illustrated by advice on setting up a team: assign testing, validation and archival duties before interpreting the evidence.

A reliable record preserves enough context for another person to repeat the check. Include the resolver address, exact DNS reply, response status, redirect destination, timestamps and network description. Save error bodies and relevant headers, but avoid collecting unnecessary personal data from affected services.

  • Repeat the same URL at fixed times from at least two independent networks.
  • Record the exact DNS reply and HTTP result, including when no response arrives.
  • Test a control domain to identify resolver, routing and certificate failures.
  • Compare consumer broadband, mobile data and an independent measurement vantage point.
  • Classify each observation by confidence rather than labelling it censorship immediately.

What to remember when evidence conflicts

The most important rule is not to infer a blocking mechanism from a single symptom. NXDOMAIN is evidence about a resolver, while 403 is evidence about an application or intermediary. A missing response indicates that the request did not complete, but it does not reveal which layer stopped it.

The durable lesson is to treat each layer as evidence, not as the verdict. Preserve the observations, compare networks, and state the strongest explanation supported by the combined DNS and HTTP results.

Transparent, analytical, community-run

The platform documents how ISPs handle neutrality on the wire, with method notes, country breakdowns and a public blacklist of injected addresses. — Project methodology
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Country reports at a glance

Snapshots from the published country reports. Open a tile to view the full regional analysis on the Reports page.

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Follow new probes, blacklist updates and country reports as they are published.

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