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Net Neutrality Monitor analyses how Internet Service Providers resolve, block and inject DNS traffic. The platform tracks servers under examination, surfaces country-level reports, and publishes a live blacklist of injected addresses.

View Country Reports
Continuous DNS probing across participating ISPs
Country-level neutrality scoring and breakdowns
Blacklist of injected addresses from probe data
Community-driven via forum, IRC and wiki

What the platform does

Net Neutrality Monitor provides real-time analysis of the censorship systems used by Internet Service Providers. It tracks DNS servers currently under examination, lists known DNS servers that respond correctly to specific tests, and produces country reports on the types of blocking detected — from gambling and file-sharing to streaming and image hosting.

  • DNS probes
  • Country reports
  • Injected addresses
  • ISP scoring
About the Project
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Coverage across the monitored regions

Country reports are available for China, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Korea Republic of, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and additional regions as new probes are activated.

  • 11+Countries with published reports
  • LiveDNS server list under examination
  • CC BY 2.5 IT / BY-SA 3.0Content licensing applied
  • OpenDonations and probe submissions
Browse DNS List
Monitored since 2010 Geo data · ipinfodb

Why our probes sometimes detect a vanishing block

A block observed by our probes can disappear within hours without any major change in public policy. That does not make the first result useless. It tells us that a particular request, at a particular moment, from a particular network path, met a condition that prevented normal access.

The important distinction is between an active restriction and the residue of one. DNS caches, edge networks and temporary abuse controls can preserve the appearance of blocking after the underlying rule has changed. Net Neutrality Monitor is a beta, volunteer-supported project developed and powered by AirVPN; its reports provide indicative research data rather than a complete census of Australian filtering. A result therefore needs a timestamp, a baseline and a follow-up observation before it supports a strong claim about censorship.

A disappearing block is a snapshot, not a verdict

Our probes sample Internet conditions rather than operate a complete view of every Australian network. Each check may depend on the probe’s location, its ISP, the DNS resolver it uses and whether the test reaches an IPv4 or IPv6 destination. A match on one path is evidence of an observed interference or failure, not a national verdict. The public blacklist can provide useful context for a hostname or address, but it cannot reconstruct a rule that was live yesterday and absent today.

Automated review can also mistake a temporary failure for deliberate filtering. A timeout may reflect congestion; a reset may be a defensive response to suspicious traffic. Conversely, a block page can be an intentional policy decision even if it is poorly documented. Researchers should record what was returned, rather than assign every unreachable page a censorship label.

Observation Immediate reading Possible explanations What to check next
DNS lookup returns a blocked address The resolver did not return the expected address Filtering rule, sinkhole, resolver-specific policy Inspect the A and AAAA answers and retry through another resolver
HTTP request returns a denial page The request was refused URL filter, shared-server policy, application-level block Compare the headers and body with a normal response
Destination becomes unreachable briefly Traffic cannot complete Route withdrawal, mitigation, congestion, origin failure Check IPv4, IPv6 and route stability
Access returns on a later attempt The earlier obstruction may no longer be active Temporary rule, cache expiry, edge configuration change Compare timestamps and repeat the same measurement

The practical rule is to preserve the original observation and compare it with a fresh test from the same measurement point. If access recovers while the target remains unchanged, the result belongs in the category of transient or unresolved events until its cause is established.

What the probe actually measures

DNS measurement asks whether a resolver returns the address published by the target’s authoritative DNS, substitutes a different address, or provides no usable answer. An NXDOMAIN response, a reserved sinkhole address and a refused query can have different causes, even when a browser ultimately shows the same error. A lookup can succeed while HTTP traffic is filtered, and an HTTP request can succeed through a different resolver from the one originally tested.

Timing matters as much as the rule itself. When a filter denies a domain, an answer may remain cached according to the resolver’s negative-caching settings. Australian households and small offices often use router-provided DNS or an ISP resolver, so the same withdrawn filter may linger at some points and disappear immediately at others. A mobile network can apply a different policy from the fixed broadband connection in the same building.

A later successful measurement can establish that an access failure has ended without identifying who ended it or why. The useful evidence is a sequence: first observation, timestamp, resolver, response code, retries through another path and subsequent recovery. That sequence separates a one-off error from a repeated pattern that deserves attribution.

Where temporary blocks come from

Some blocks are short-lived because enforcement is short-lived. A hosting provider may disable a domain after an abuse report, then restore it after the complaint is reviewed. Network operators apply temporary reputation controls during malware, phishing or automated-attack spikes. Reverse proxies and content delivery networks can serve several sites from one address, so a rule aimed at one tenant can affect others on the same edge.

Shared hosting creates a familiar false-positive pattern. Consider a free-spins gambling guide: if its publisher uses infrastructure alongside material that attracts abuse complaints, an edge-level response could affect more URLs than intended. This does not prove that the guide itself was targeted. It illustrates why an IP address must be mapped to the relevant hostname and service before an event is described as censorship of a particular site.

Other interruptions are not censorship at all. A withdrawn route, an overloaded origin, an expired certificate or an incomplete deployment can disrupt access for minutes or hours. Geolocation and anycast systems complicate attribution further: the same hostname may resolve to different addresses in Sydney and Melbourne, and one address may be restricted while another is not.

Why Australian conditions make the pattern common

Australia’s connectivity market is concentrated around major providers such as Telstra, Optus, Vodafone and TPG, with smaller fixed-wireless, business and regional providers alongside them. People in Sydney and Melbourne commonly move among fibre or DSL broadband, 4G and 5G mobile connections, and public Wi-Fi at cafés, universities and transit hubs. Each route can use a different resolver, middlebox and routing policy, so one device can move from a filtered path to an unrestricted one within a day.

Legislation adds another layer. The Interactive Gambling Act 2001 and Australian Communications and Media Authority enforcement against certain offshore online gambling services can make an otherwise ordinary domain unreachable for a legal-policy reason. This is regulatory blocking, not evidence of general-purpose censorship, and it may be implemented through DNS or network infrastructure. The Telecommunications Act 1997 governs service obligations, but it does not create an identical content experience on every Australian network.

Regional connectivity adds its own differences. Fixed-wireless and satellite services outside metropolitan areas can use upstream DNS and international routing that differs from urban fibre. Temporary congestion or an upstream policy can therefore look local to a household in regional Australia without originating with its ISP. Comparing results across paths, rather than pooling them, preserves that distinction.

How to verify a disappearing restriction

Start with the exact URL, address and timestamp. Record the DNS response separately from the HTTP result, then retry through an unaffected resolver and, where possible, a different connection type. A second Australian vantage point can test whether the issue follows the site, the IP address or the access network. A successful manual browser visit is not proof that the original probe was wrong, because encrypted DNS, cached results and browser extensions can change the path.

Administrative comparisons can be useful when the technical record is thin. A review of a regional certificate marketplace concerns renewable energy certificates rather than Internet filtering, but the underlying principle is relevant: explicit records and auditable transactions make a disputed event easier to investigate. Internet measurements need comparable traceability.

Then classify the outcome conservatively. Use “confirmed block” when the imposed response is demonstrable and repeats; use “transient interference” when the symptom is real but its mechanism is unknown; use “access failure” when a timeout or network error is all that is available. Publish the time window and raw result alongside the interpretation so a later reader can distinguish a temporary intervention from a stable policy.

The concrete next step is to re-run the submitted URL or IP address from the same probe location and log the recovery time, DNS answer and HTTP result.

Transparent, analytical, community-run

The platform documents how ISPs handle neutrality on the wire, with method notes, country breakdowns and a public blacklist of injected addresses. — Project methodology
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Country reports at a glance

Snapshots from the published country reports. Open a tile to view the full regional analysis on the Reports page.

Minimal line drawing of Italy outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Denmark outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Switzerland outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Thailand outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Turkey outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Malaysia outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Belgium outline in red on white

Follow new probes, blacklist updates and country reports as they are published.

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