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Net Neutrality Monitor analyses how Internet Service Providers resolve, block and inject DNS traffic. The platform tracks servers under examination, surfaces country-level reports, and publishes a live blacklist of injected addresses.

View Country Reports
Continuous DNS probing across participating ISPs
Country-level neutrality scoring and breakdowns
Blacklist of injected addresses from probe data
Community-driven via forum, IRC and wiki

What the platform does

Net Neutrality Monitor provides real-time analysis of the censorship systems used by Internet Service Providers. It tracks DNS servers currently under examination, lists known DNS servers that respond correctly to specific tests, and produces country reports on the types of blocking detected — from gambling and file-sharing to streaming and image hosting.

  • DNS probes
  • Country reports
  • Injected addresses
  • ISP scoring
About the Project
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Coverage across the monitored regions

Country reports are available for China, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Korea Republic of, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and additional regions as new probes are activated.

  • 11+Countries with published reports
  • LiveDNS server list under examination
  • CC BY 2.5 IT / BY-SA 3.0Content licensing applied
  • OpenDonations and probe submissions
Browse DNS List
Monitored since 2010 Geo data · ipinfodb

Checking blocked sites on alternative DNS ports

A website can appear blocked because DNS returns no usable address, an ISP interferes with the connection, or the destination blocks the request. These failures look similar in a browser but require different checks. Testing whether a blocked domain remains inaccessible through a different DNS transport can reveal where the restriction occurs.

Alternative DNS ports change the route between a device and a resolver, not necessarily the website’s availability. Net Neutrality Monitor provides a way to submit URLs or IP addresses for monitoring and compare country-specific censorship observations with blacklist, probe, DNS, and statistical data.

What alternative DNS ports actually test

Traditional DNS usually uses UDP port 53, with TCP port 53 available for large responses and fallback. Encrypted DNS commonly uses DNS over TLS on TCP port 853 or DNS over HTTPS on TCP port 443. DNS over QUIC can also use UDP port 853 where a resolver and client support it.

A restriction may occur at the resolver, along the network path, or after DNS has produced an address. Resolver filtering can suppress a domain, while ISP filtering can block ordinary DNS traffic. Connection-level controls may instead block the server’s IP address or the TLS hostname after resolution succeeds.

Changing ports is therefore not a universal bypass. It can expose filtering tied to ordinary DNS while leaving SNI filtering, IP blocking, resolver policy and server-side restrictions intact. The resolver’s location and filtering policy remain part of the test.

Establishing a reliable port 53 baseline

Begin with the same URL tested on the network being investigated. Record the exact domain, including any www prefix, because different hostnames can use different CDN edges. A useful baseline is dig example.com followed by dig +tcp example.com, while a browser test records whether the failure appears as a DNS error, timeout, TLS error or HTTP response.

Compare UDP and TCP results rather than assuming both fail for the same reason. A working TCP response beside a timed-out UDP request suggests UDP-specific interference. Both protocols failing points more strongly toward domain filtering, a network-wide DNS restriction or an unavailable upstream path. A known-good domain provides a basic control for the connection and resolver.

Retain the resolver address, response status, returned A and AAAA records, timestamp and access network. Only submit a URL or IP address you own or are authorised to monitor; the project’s monitoring submission guidance explains the relevant considerations for responsible submissions.

Comparing encrypted and alternative DNS paths

Configure a browser or dedicated DNS client to use a secure resolver, then repeat the lookup and website request. DoH normally travels over HTTPS on port 443, while DoT uses TLS on port 853. Support for custom ports varies, so confirm the resolver’s current configuration rather than assuming every client can select one.

Choose the resolver deliberately. A public service located outside Australia may provide a different route and policy from an Australian ISP resolver, while a business DNS service may apply its own malware or category filtering. A successful lookup does not prove that the website is unrestricted if the alternative resolver is refusing to resolve it.

Useful path combinations

  • System DNS over UDP 53 establishes the ordinary baseline.
  • System DNS over TCP 53 checks for UDP-specific interference.
  • DNS over TLS on 853 tests encrypted resolution outside port 53.
  • DNS over HTTPS on 443 tests an encrypted path resembling normal web traffic.

What to record for each run

  • The complete hostname, including subdomain and protocol.
  • The resolver name, endpoint and approximate location.
  • DNS status, returned IP addresses and connection outcome.
  • The time, device and network used for the test.

Repeat each combination several times and keep the variables stable. Separate DNS resolution from the subsequent page request: a valid address followed by a TLS failure indicates a different problem from an empty response.

Reading and classifying monitoring evidence

Net Neutrality Monitor lets users submit a URL or IP address and review observations associated with particular countries and network providers. The beta service is volunteer-supported and powered by AirVPN; its project background provides context for the project and the data it publishes. Results should be understood as indicative research observations rather than a court-like determination of censorship.

For each monitored address, compare the DNS result with any probe or blacklist finding. A failed lookup in one country but not another may indicate geographic filtering, different resolver policies or distinct network routes. Repeated failures across several Australian providers carry more weight than a single failed observation, although they still require careful controls.

The following patterns help separate network behaviour:

Observation Likely mechanism What it does not prove Useful comparison
Port 53 fails while 853 or 443 succeeds Filtering or interference affecting ordinary DNS The domain is universally blocked Repeat with the same resolver and location
UDP 53 fails while TCP 53 succeeds UDP-specific network control The website itself is unavailable Test another domain through the same resolver
Resolution succeeds but TLS or HTTP fails SNI, IP, CDN or server-side blocking DNS is the cause of the failure Compare addresses and response errors
Different resolvers return different CDN addresses Geolocation, split-horizon DNS or normal routing A censorship decision occurred Record resolver location and both responses
Results change between attempts Transient routing, caching or resolver variation Either result is conclusive Repeat over time and across networks

Separating DNS blocks from connection blocks

DNS failures have different meanings. NXDOMAIN states that the name does not exist, SERVFAIL reports a resolver or upstream problem, and a timeout suggests that no usable response arrived. Public resolvers may also apply protective blocking and return a deliberately altered address for harmful domains.

A successful DNS response does not establish that the website is reachable. The connection may time out, TLS negotiation may expose an SNI-based block, or the server may return an HTTP 403. Reverse-proxy and CDN errors can resemble ISP filtering, so browser evidence should be checked against a separate connection attempt.

Retest after changing only one condition, such as the resolver transport or access network. If several unrelated paths agree, the result is stronger. If outcomes diverge, keep the evidence separate rather than averaging it into a vague claim that the site is “sometimes blocked”.

Accounting for Australian network conditions

Australian internet access is not governed by one uniform resolver. Major providers include Telstra, Optus, TPG and Vodafone, while NBN connections on FTTP, FTTN and HFC may use the access provider’s DNS. Mobile services and regional providers such as iiNet and Aussie Broadband can follow different routing and filtering arrangements, so household broadband and mobile results may differ.

Location also matters within Australia. Resolver and CDN infrastructure serving Sydney or Melbourne may select different anycast edges, while a remote overseas resolver can return an address optimised for another country. For accurate comparisons, keep the device in the same metropolitan area and record which resolver supplies the answer.

Australian blocking arrangements add another variable. ACSC-issued notices and the Cleanfeed malware list can lead to blocking of malicious domains, distinct from broader political or legal restrictions. A URL blocked for malware should not be presented as evidence of general censorship. Published datasets can also use different methods and time windows; why monitoring results differ explains the sources of variation.

Public Wi-Fi encountered while travelling through Australian customs, airport terminals or hotels can add captive portals, authentication redirects and local DNS controls. A timeout on such a network is evidence about that network, not about Australian access generally. Comparisons with mobile data and a known-good domain help identify these temporary conditions.

The result worth remembering

A finding becomes persuasive when the same hostname, time period, resolver geography and access method are compared across ordinary and encrypted DNS paths. Working on port 853 or 443 after port 53 fails suggests a restriction tied to conventional DNS, but it does not identify who imposed it or prove that it applies nationally.

The essential point is to separate DNS filtering from later connection blocking. DNS ports alter the path to a resolver, while the resolver’s policy, the network route and the destination server determine the final result. The strongest conclusion comes from a repeated pattern of observations, not from one inaccessible page.

Transparent, analytical, community-run

The platform documents how ISPs handle neutrality on the wire, with method notes, country breakdowns and a public blacklist of injected addresses. — Project methodology
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Country reports at a glance

Snapshots from the published country reports. Open a tile to view the full regional analysis on the Reports page.

Minimal line drawing of Italy outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Denmark outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Switzerland outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Thailand outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Turkey outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Malaysia outline in red on white Minimal line drawing of Belgium outline in red on white

Follow new probes, blacklist updates and country reports as they are published.

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